Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta stu ....Rank-dependent choice equilibrium. This project aims to develop and test a new statistical theory of games, Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium (RDCE), which has the potential to unify and improve on existing approaches where the extreme reliance on perfect decision making and perfect foresight has raised doubts about their empirical relevance. The project intends to develop the theoretical foundations of RDCE, explore its relation with various parametric approaches, and evaluate RDCE via meta studies and stress tests. Expected outcomes of RDCE include a paradigm shift in game theory, resulting in broader acceptance and adoption of statistical game theory and to more robust policy recommendations.Read moreRead less
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award - Grant ID: DE180100190
Funder
Australian Research Council
Funding Amount
$363,996.00
Summary
Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, ....Auction design with behavioural bidders. This project aims to incorporate behavioural elements from psychology into the economic analysis of auctions. The project will address discrepancies between traditional economic analysis of auctions based on fully rational bidders, and evidence from psychology and behavioural economics which demonstrates systemic departures from rational decision-making. This will expand realism in economic analysis and contribute new insights for the design of relevant, real-world auctions such as real-estate auctions or internet auctions. The project outcomes are expected to enhance the efficient allocation of resources, improve our understanding of how different rules affect buyers' well-being and help design fairer auctions.Read moreRead less
Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. T ....Designing Efficient and Equitable Voting Mechanisms. The most commonly used method for collective decision making, majority voting, is generally not efficient as it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. In addition, majority voting suffers from the tyranny of the majority, i.e. the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final downside of majority voting is its winner-take-all nature, i.e. it provides no compensation for losing voters. This project concerns the design of alternative mechanisms that avoid these shortcomings and robustly deliver efficient and equitable outcomes. The project develops the theory underlying these novel mechanisms, tests them in a range of environments, and delivers an implementation for practical use.
Read moreRead less