ORCID Profile
0000-0001-9574-6064
Current Organisation
Deakin University
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Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 04-2010
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 20-02-2010
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-2007
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 30-07-2017
DOI: 10.1111/EJOP.12278
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 27-09-2023
DOI: 10.3390/REL14101240
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 09-2015
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 07-02-2009
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK
Date: 2009
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2012
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 28-02-2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 28-05-2017
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-2011
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2013.826054
Abstract: Self-reflexive or egocentric concern has been taken to present a serious problem for reductionist and eliminativist metaphysical accounts of personal identity. Philosophers have tended to respond in one of three ways: by continuing the search for a metaphysical account of identity that (prudentially if not morally) justifies egocentric concern by accepting that egocentric concern can hold between persons who are not numerically identical or by advocating the abandonment of egocentric concern altogether. All these approaches, however, distinguish between metaphysical ‘facts’ and affective responses to them. Exploring a well-known ex le from Bernard Williams, I argue that egocentric concern presents itself as irreducibly first-personal and as making its own set of numerical personal identity claims on the phenomenal level. Williams' ex le also points to the need to complicate the first/third person schema by factoring in a further distinction between present-tense and implicitly atemporal perspectives on the self. Once this move is made, we can see that the identity claims figured in first-person present-tense experience and those arrived at through metaphysical deliberation need to be distinguished. We should resist the temptation to privilege one perspective over the other in all instances, or to collapse them into a unitary account of selfhood.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Date: 2013
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 19-04-2016
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-04-2018
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 14-07-2010
Publisher: De Gruyter
Date: 24-04-2017
Publisher: Sissa Medialab Srl
Date: 28-03-2017
DOI: 10.22323/2.16010303
Abstract: While science communication has become increasingly professionalised, philosophers have been far less active in, and reflective about, how we talk to the public. In thinking about the relationship between the ‘public intellectual’ and science communication, however, philosophy has some important contributions to make, despite the differences of content and disciplinary approach. What, then, can both these professions learn from each other about how to engage with the public - and the risks that this might involve?
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2008
DOI: 10.5840/IPQ200848463
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-11-2011
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1442402
Abstract: Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ (PLV) offers an account of personal identity whereby persons are the unified loci of our practical and ethical judgment. PLV also recognises infants and permanent vegetative state patients as being persons. I argue that the way PLV handles these cases yields an unexpected result: the dead also remain persons, contrary to the widely-accepted ‘Termination Thesis.’ Even more surprisingly, this actually counts in PLV’s favor: in light of our social and ethical practices which treat the dead as moral patients, PLV gives a more plausible account of the status of the dead than its rival theories.
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 02-05-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 16-11-2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 23-02-2007
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-2008
Publisher: De Gruyter
Date: 31-05-2019
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 12-2015
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 2013
DOI: 10.1515/KIER.2013.2013.1.475
Abstract: Jamie Turnbull has argued that Kierkegaard cannot be read either as a philosopher or as someone whose work can be understood and utilised in philosophical terms. In a previous Yearbook article, he singles us out as representative of a misguided approach that sees Kierkegaard as capable of contributing to contemporary philosophical debates. In this paper, we argue that Turnbull’s position both fails in its own terms and depends upon an unduly narrow conception of philosophy.
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2014
DOI: 10.5840/TPM20146551
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 11-2010
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-10-2011
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2015
No related grants have been discovered for Patrick Stokes.