ORCID Profile
0000-0002-4832-6611
Current Organisations
University of Tasmania
,
University of Melbourne
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Publisher: White Horse Press
Date: 04-2023
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 03-04-2019
Publisher: S. Karger AG
Date: 2019
DOI: 10.1159/000499315
Abstract: Categorization-based diagnosis, which endeavors to be consistent with the third-person, objective measures of science, is not always adequate with respect to problems concerning diagnostic accuracy, demarcation problems when there are comorbidities, well-documented problems of symptom lification, and complications of stigmatization and looping effects. While psychiatric categories have proved useful and convenient for clinicians in identifying a recognizable constellation of symptoms typical for a particular disorder for the purposes of communication and eligibility for treatment regimes, the reification of these categories has without doubt had negative consequences for the patient and also for the general understanding of psychiatric disorders. We argue that a complementary, integrated framework that focuses on descriptive symptom-based classifications (drawing on phenomenological interview methods and narrative) combined with a more comprehensive conception of the human subject (found in the pattern theory of self), can not only offer a solution to some of the vexed issues of psychiatric diagnosis but also support more efficacious therapeutic interventions.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 27-06-2019
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 25-03-2014
DOI: 10.1111/EJOP.12086
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
Date: 2018
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 13-01-2021
Publisher: Frontiers Media SA
Date: 11-05-2018
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 16-06-2022
DOI: 10.3390/PHILOSOPHIES7030067
Abstract: This paper addresses the persistent philosophical problem posed by the amoralist—one who eschews moral values—by drawing on complementary resources within phenomenology and care ethics. How is it that the amoralist can reject ethical injunctions that serve the general good and be unpersuaded by ethical intuitions that for most would require neither explanation nor justification? And more generally, what is the basis for ethical motivation? Why is it that we can care for others? What are the underpinning ontological structures that are able to support an ethics of care? To respond to these questions, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty, focusing specifically on his analyses of perceptual attention. What is the nature and quality of perceptual attention that underwrite our capacities or incapacities for care? I proceed in dialogue with a range of philosophers attuned to the compelling nature of care, some who have also drawn on Merleau-Ponty and others who have examined the roots of an ethics of care inspired or incited by other thinkers.
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 02-10-2014
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 06-2022
Location: France
Location: France
Start Date: 2017
End Date: 2017
Funder: University of Melbourne
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2017
End Date: 2017
Funder: University Of Oxford
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2005
End Date: 2005
Funder: Deakin University
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2005
End Date: 2005
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2005
End Date: 2005
Funder: Melbourne Research, University of Melbourne
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2009
End Date: 2010
Funder: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 2016
End Date: 2018
Funder: Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences
View Funded Activity