ORCID Profile
0000-0002-5820-2233
Current Organisation
Murdoch University
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Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 04-2019
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2014
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Date: 2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2018
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 07-07-2023
DOI: 10.3390/ELECTRONICS12132990
Abstract: The maritime sector employs the Internet of Things (IoT) to exploit many of its benefits to maintain a competitive advantage and keep up with the growing demands of the global economy. The maritime IoT (MIoT) not only inherits similar security threats as the general IoT, it also faces cyber threats that do not exist in the traditional IoT due to factors such as the support for long-distance communication and low-bandwidth connectivity. Therefore, the MIoT presents a significant concern for the sustainability and security of the maritime industry, as a successful cyber attack can be detrimental to national security and have a flow-on effect on the global economy. A common component of maritime IoT systems is Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. It has been revealed in previous studies that current RFID authentication protocols are insecure against a number of attacks. This paper provides an overview of vulnerabilities relating to maritime RFID systems and systematically reviews lightweight RFID authentication protocols and their impacts if they were to be used in the maritime sector. Specifically, this paper investigates the capabilities of lightweight RFID authentication protocols that could be used in a maritime environment by evaluating those authentication protocols in terms of the encryption system, authentication method, and resistance to various wireless attacks.
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2016
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2016
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 19-04-2023
DOI: 10.3390/MATH11081929
Abstract: The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of a range of devices that communicate with other devices that are surrounding them. Secure communications between IoT devices have been an essential requirement. However, most existing authentication protocols fail to provide privacy protection for devices such that sensitive information including device owner’s identity and device type can be leaked. In this paper, based on attribute-based encryption (ABE), we propose two private and mutual authentication protocols to protect the privacy of IoT devices. The first protocol is a three-message key exchange protocol, following the public-key encryption mode of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). The second protocol is a one-round key exchange protocol, thereby providing simplicity and efficiency of messages communicated between the participants. Both of our protocols can be proved secure in the defined model. Finally, we implement the two protocols in an open source framework.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2016
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 05-09-2019
DOI: 10.1002/CPE.4706
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2020
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 2020
Publisher: Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET)
Date: 2015
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 08-2018
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 2023
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 04-08-2014
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 12-02-2016
Publisher: Inderscience Publishers
Date: 2014
Publisher: Academy Publisher
Date: 08-2011
Publisher: MDPI AG
Date: 15-06-2023
DOI: 10.3390/MATH11122721
Abstract: A bad randomness may cause catastrophic results in security thus, it is of importance to make cryptographic systems secure against bad randomness. In this paper, we focus on a practical situation where an adversary is able to force participants in an authenticated key exchange (AKE) system to reuse the random values and the functions of these values, called related randomness attack (RRA). Following the existing randomness resetting security model of AKE and the RRA security model of public-key encryption, we present a model of RRA security for authenticated key exchange, as well as the necessary restrictions on the related randomness functions used to obtain the security definition. Then we show how a related randomness attack adversary breaks the security of some existing AKE protocols, and propose some constructions of RRA-secure authenticated key exchange in the random oracle model and standard model, respectively.
Publisher: International Academy Publishing (IAP)
Date: 2009
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 03-2023
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2017
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 07-2013
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 05-2018
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2017
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2017
Publisher: Academy Publisher
Date: 12-2009
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 07-2023
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2017
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 07-2019
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2019
Publisher: IEEE
Date: 09-2015
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2016
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 12-2020
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2018
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 09-2019
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Date: 2013
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 29-01-2020
DOI: 10.1002/CPE.5680
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 2018
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 02-2018
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2023
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 2023
No related grants have been discovered for Hui Cui.