ORCID Profile
0000-0002-2353-0448
Current Organisation
Deakin University
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Publisher: Brill
Date: 03-08-2022
DOI: 10.1163/18754112-25020007
Abstract: The Russian invasion of Ukraine has once again brought the question of the limits of the veto by the P5 in the UN Security Council into the spotlight. This short piece examines the possibility of the veto power of the P5 being restricted and the possibility of reform of the UN Charter to restrict or abolish the veto. After concluding that the drafting of the Charter makes these approaches unworkable it then considers the possibility of the UN being reformed under a new Charter that has a more equitable Security Council – concluding that such an approach is functionally impossible.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 07-2022
DOI: 10.1017/S0020589322000227
Abstract: Cyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable ‘law of peace’, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello .
Publisher: Queensland University of Technology
Date: 14-03-2022
DOI: 10.5204/LTHJ.1583
Abstract: Understanding the descriptors attached to cyber operations and cyber actors is crucial to communicating the nature of these entities and the influence they wield in cyberspace. Given the ever-increasing threat that corporations, governments, and the everyday consumer face from these entities, it is paramount that respondents evaluate and apply the most appropriate descriptors when communicating about such incidents. In this paper, we discuss whether a ‘privateer’ analogy has relevance in this space given the current state of cyber-actor behaviour and the increase in the number of governments relying on external experts to design, construct, and execute cyber-disruption operations. In determining the appropriateness of the ‘privateer’ analogy, we explore the following questions: What types of labels are available for this private actor-perpetrated, but state-purposed cyber-operational conduct? Based on a brief history of privateering, how and why might privateering be an appropriate analogy? Given the strict legal paradigmatic constraints surrounding the availability of the concept and the availability of modern Law of Armed Combat (LoAC) concepts to cover the practice, how and why is privateering not an appropriate analogy? Ultimately, we conclude that the applicability of the ‘privateering’ analogy in the context of cyber operations is dubious. It appears that international law has developed beyond the need (and desire) for privateers and privateering operations. In this discussion, we consider legal and regulatory alternatives for responding to cyber behaviour that may still resemble privateering under effective (and much more current) international law.
Publisher: Brill
Date: 08-04-2020
DOI: 10.1163/18754112-0220104009
Abstract: The UN Security Council’s response to the Rwanda genocide was a significant moment in history. It changed the face of international law, cementing in idual criminal responsibility for atrocities in the canon of international law. It also saw the Security Council respond to mass atrocities without the consent of the state in question in a manner that ran counter to historical practice. But all of these outcomes are haunted by the fact that decisions made by the Security Council in the build up to the genocide served to create the conditions on the ground that allowed genocide to flourish. This intervention conducts a critical discourse analysis of the statements made by the Permanent Five members of the Security Council justifying these decisions in the context of whether Rwanda constituted a ‘threat to the peace’ under article 39 of the UN Charter, concluding that Security Council through its decisions was complicit in the genocide.
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 27-01-2017
DOI: 10.1093/JCSL/KRV028
Publisher: Brill | Nijhoff
Date: 22-11-2021
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-07-2020
Publisher: Oxford University Press (OUP)
Date: 21-04-2022
DOI: 10.1093/JCSL/KRAC014
Abstract: Submarine data cables are of fundamental strategic consequence. However, two intensely context-sensitive and contemporary sets of questions about how these cables are to be dealt with by the law of armed conflict remain—questions which state practice during the two World Wars either did not resolve or did not need to address. Through an examination of the relevant legal history and current law, this article seeks to explore potential answers to these question sets. The first question set relates to the general approach to be adopted when dealing with submarine data cables within LOAC: a sui generis regime discrete analogy or general principles? The second question set addresses three lingering queries regarding legal characterization of submarine data cables for LOAC purposes, namely: (i) Are they ordinary military objectives? (ii) Can they be considered neutral objects? (iii) How do we assess proportionality in relation to attack on submarine data cables? The analysis concludes that a modified application of the ordinary rule of proportionality in LOAC targeting, noting some of the difficulties surrounding the concepts of incidental damage in this context, offers the most useful way forward.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 28-07-2021
Publisher: Fachinformationsdienst für internationale und interdisziplinäre Rechtsforschung
Date: 2022
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Date: 03-2023
Abstract: The toxicity and abuses of power that occur within the legal profession are well-known, and a long-standing problem. In this paper we explore how kindness and community building in the study and practice of law can lead to better outcomes for all concerned. We do this through an examination of literature addressing the legal profession and law school, and behavioural research on the impacts of prosocial behaviour, which leads us to conclude that Elle Woods in the role model that any lawyer or law student who is interested in kindness should look to for inspiration. While this approach may not solve the wholesale cultural issues faced in law school in the legal profession, we suggest it might create pockets of alternate reality for those who love the law but hate the culture of the legal profession.
Publisher: Brill
Date: 12-2021
DOI: 10.1163/15718107-90040006
Abstract: Within the ideological confines of Western liberal democracies, two ‘truths’ are held to be self-evident: that Russia and China are opportunistic in their behaviour, and that this behaviour is strategic rather than sincere. This article is a short, empirical analysis of the justifications of Russia and China when determining a ‘threat to the peace’ in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. Examining how Russia and China have justified their decisions where this concept was significantly under debate, I find that their behaviour is not as opportunistic as believed. Rather, it is consistent with ideals of pragmatism and state-centric interpretations of international law. I further suggest that the consistency of their approaches means it is of little consequence if their arguments are strategic in nature.
No related grants have been discovered for Tamsin Paige.