ORCID Profile
0000-0002-7031-414X
Current Organisation
Deakin University
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In Research Link Australia (RLA), "Research Topics" refer to ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes. These topics are either sourced from ANZSRC FOR and SEO codes listed in researchers' related grants or generated by a large language model (LLM) based on their publications.
Finance Economics | Economic Models And Forecasting | Economic Theory | Banking, Finance and Investment | Materials Engineering | Microeconomic Theory | Finance | Physical Metallurgy | Alloy Materials | Finance | Financial Econometrics
Microeconomic issues not elsewhere classified | Market-Based Mechanisms | Technological and organisational innovation | Management | Structural metal products | Finance Services |
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 14-10-2019
DOI: 10.1111/ACFI.12407
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-12-2015
DOI: 10.1111/FIMA.12071
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 08-09-2015
DOI: 10.1002/JAE.2412
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-1992
Publisher: Emerald
Date: 02-1999
DOI: 10.1108/01443589910252584
Abstract: Using a differentiated oligopoly, this paper studies the effects of tax incentives on the structure of a domestic industry in terms of price, output, profit, and entry/exit, taking account of technology transfer through FDI. It is found that if the government of the host country provides more tax relief for foreign firms, it will raise total output and reduce the price index. More foreign firms will enter the industry while certain existing host firms will have to exit. Consumers are better off if income is unchanged otherwise, the change in social welfare is ambiguous in general and several sufficient conditions ensuring definite outcomes have been identified. This suggests that the government should be cautious in reducing taxes to attract FDI and should differ their preferential tax treatments across industries.
Publisher: Emerald
Date: 02-2005
DOI: 10.1108/01443580510574841
Abstract: Although economic theory generally does not support government intervention in international trade, casual observation shows that many developing countries adopt certain trade policies to promote their exports. The objective of this paper is to answer the question that whether developing countries can benefit from export promotion. This paper considers a developing country which has to import new technology from the world market to improve its productivity. If it has certain economic rigidities, the country is short of foreign exchange and domestic firms cannot import an adequate amount of new technology. Even if there is no rigidity, domestic firms may not have sufficient incentive to invest in new technology. Therefore, the government can step in to subsidize exports. Through an analytical model, this paper investigates in what conditions the measures of export promotion can stimulate production and employment, and improve efficiency and social welfare. This paper analyzes two effects of export promotion: raising the incentive of capital investment and reducing capital goods shortage caused by foreign exchange constraint. These effects might be the economic rationale for developing country governments to promote exports. It is found that export promotion can definitely raise employment and productivity, but whether these measures can stimulate the supply to the domestic market and improve domestic welfare depends on the sufficient and necessary condition given in the paper. Establishes an analytical model to investigate in what conditions the measures of export promotion such as export subsidies and domestic currency devaluation can stimulate production and employment, and can improve efficiency and social welfare.
Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Date: 04-1987
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2008
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2010
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 17-03-2017
DOI: 10.1111/IRFI.12121
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 22-08-2011
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 08-2005
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 06-2004
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2000
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 2003
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2017
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-08-2020
DOI: 10.1111/ACFI.12520
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 09-2000
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Date: 16-06-2020
DOI: 10.1017/S002210902000037X
Abstract: Institutional demand for a stock before its earnings announcement is negatively related to subsequent returns. The relation is not attributable to the price pressure of institutional demand and is stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry and/or greater valuation difficulty. These findings support the notion that overconfident institutions misprice stocks. Following announcements, institutions’ behavior exhibits the outcome-dependent feature of self-attribution bias. Whether they become more overconfident and delay their mispricing correction depends on whether earnings news confirms their preannouncement trades. This behavioral bias also offers a new explanation for the well-known post-earnings-announcement drift.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 19-03-2010
Abstract: This paper studies the effects of principal's risk aversion on principal-agent relationship under hidden information. It finds that the agent's equilibrium effort increases and approaches the efficient level as the principal's risk aversion increases and tends to infinity. Allowing for random participation by the agent, his effort can be efficient even when the principal's risk aversion is finite. For the case of common agency with random participation, it is optimal for the principals to make the agent the residual claimant on profits and the principals' net profits monotonically decrease to zero when their risk aversion tends to infinity.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 1998
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2014
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2006
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-2014
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2001
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-1998
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 20-08-2008
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 26-05-2012
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 2012
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 10-2013
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 10-2001
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-2001
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2017
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 24-09-2015
DOI: 10.1111/IRFI.12038
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 03-1997
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 09-2018
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 12-2003
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-05-2005
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 12-2006
DOI: 10.1177/031289620603100201
Abstract: Recent corporate scandals around the world have led many to single out executive stock options as one of the main culprits. More corporations are abandoning stock options and reverting to restricted stock. This paper argues that such a change is not entirely justifiable. We first provide a critical review of the pros and cons of executive stock options. We then compare option-based contracts with stock-based contracts using a simple principal-agent model with moral hazard. In a general environment without restrictions on preferences or technologies, option-based contracts are shown to weakly dominate stock-based contracts. The weak dominance relation becomes strict if the manager is risk neutral. Numerical ex les are provided to show that, even if the manager is risk averse, strict dominance is more likely the case.
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 05-2009
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 03-1998
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 08-2011
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 06-1997
Publisher: Wiley
Date: 07-2004
Publisher: Elsevier BV
Date: 11-2020
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Date: 09-1999
Start Date: 2014
End Date: 12-2017
Amount: $174,553.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 01-2006
End Date: 05-2009
Amount: $94,724.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded ActivityStart Date: 11-2004
End Date: 11-2007
Amount: $328,000.00
Funder: Australian Research Council
View Funded Activity