ORCID Profile
0000-0001-7361-7077
Current Organisation
Murdoch University
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Publisher: Routledge
Date: 16-09-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-1997
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 1999
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 05-2004
Publisher: Duke University Press
Date: 11-2000
DOI: 10.2307/2659277
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 16-09-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-2000
Publisher: Duke University Press
Date: 05-2000
DOI: 10.2307/2658713
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 06-1999
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 20-05-2014
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 02-01-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 07-2004
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 16-08-2015
Abstract: The Indian military is the world’s fourth largest after the US, Russia and China. In the immediate aftermath of India’s independence from British rule, however, it was hard to imagine that in the span of six decades, a poverty-stricken, fragmented and deeply traumatised country would emerge as a military powerhouse. How and why has this transformation taken place? Has India’s growing military prowess resulted in a more robust and adventurist foreign policy, particularly within the South Asian region? What does India’s rapid military transformation, particularly the Indian Navy, in the twenty-first century say about India’s perception of threats to national security? In this article, I argue that the Indian military’s expansion and modernisation has happened in phases, mainly as a reaction to threatening developments within the surrounding region, the evolving global strategic environment and the perceptions and decisions taken by India’s political elites. I argue, further, that as India’s military prowess and self-confidence have grown, Indian leaders have at times felt tempted to flex the military muscles, particularly in low-intensity regional conflicts, but not always with expected results. I conclude that in the twenty-first century, the Indian military, particularly the Indian Navy, is undergoing rapid expansion and transformation. This suggests that in addition to threats coming across the western and northern land borders with Pakistan and China respectively, India’s security planners envisage a growing threat to national security emanating from the deep waters of the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 09-2001
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 11-08-2015
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 06-2007
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 12-2005
Publisher: Consortium Erudit
Date: 2004
DOI: 10.7202/009912AR
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 20-05-2013
Publisher: Routledge
Date: 09-10-2023
Publisher: Informa UK Limited
Date: 03-1997
Publisher: SAGE Publications
Date: 04-2013
Abstract: India’s strategy towards the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka shifted over the course of the conflict from a strategy of diffusion to a strategy of mediation and then finally to a strategy of suppression—each strategy marking a distinct phase in the conflict. While India’s strategy shifted at different phases in the Sri Lankan conflict, the foundation on which the strategies were based—considerations of national security—remained constant. The central argument of the article is that consideration of national security, in both its internal and external dimensions, has been the main driver of India’s strategy towards the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. The empirical analysis confirms the strength of the realist dictum that national interest understood primarily in terms of national security plays the pivotal role in states’ foreign policy behaviour.
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